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Abstract 
This paper develops a restrictive procedure for evaluating economic policy decisions, by 
comparing actual economic history to a simulated history where a specific policy decision is 
replaced with a counterfactual, but credible, alternative. Our procedure is theoretically 
straightforward, but empirically problematic since it requires the identification of a feasible 
policy alternative and a model linking a specific policy choice to subsequent economic 
outcomes. We apply the procedure to the mistaken decision to maintain an excessively lax 
financial regulation regime in Ireland during the period 2003 – 2008. We measure the 
differences in banking sector stability and national income that would have occurred if the 
stricter regulatory regime imposed in Ireland in 2009 had been put in place six years earlier. 
We find that a few simple, reasonably prudent regulatory controls on the Irish banking sector 
would have greatly limited the vulnerability of the domestic sector to the 2008 global credit 
freeze, and almost certainly prevented the 2008-2009 collapse of the domestic banking sector 
and the consequent deep Irish recession of 2009-2010.  On the other hand, the risky and 
unsustainable inflow of foreign capital mediated by the domestic banks accounts for a 
substantial part of Irish economic growth during the 2003-2007 period. Without this net 
foreign borrowing inflow, cumulative gross domestic product over the early period would 
have been substantially lower.    
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1.  Introduction 
The financial and economic turmoil of the years 2007 to 2010 has led to considerable regret 
among financial and economic policymakers about bad policy decisions at earlier dates. A 
worthwhile exercise in economic analysis is careful delineation of the net economic cost of 
an earlier bad policy decision. This analysis is conceptually difficult since it requires a 
baseline case against which to compare observed economic outcomes. Simply calculating the 
economic costs associated with post-decision bad outcomes conflates bad luck and bad policy 
choice, since policy errors usually interact with bad luck in producing bad outcomes.  
Similarly, comparing the actual outcome to that from the ex-post best possible policy 
decisions at every juncture gives an unrealistically high benchmark, since it compares the 
actual outcome to that from policy decisions requiring perfect foresight by policymakers.  
Also, rational evaluation requires that all gains and losses subsequent to a policy decision are 
included – it is incorrect to evaluate an earlier past decision based on present and future 
impacts – any intermediate impacts between the past decision date and current evaluation 
date must also be considered. 
This paper suggests a theoretically simple and well-defined procedure for analyzing the ex-
post economic cost of a particular past policy decision. We suggest the comparison of actual 
economic outcomes to those which would have emanated from a real-world-feasible 
alternative under otherwise unchanged circumstances. We do this by identifying a specific 
policy choice available at the time of the decision which was “almost” chosen. We call this 
almost-but-not-chosen policy the sliding doors1
We apply the procedure to the vexed problem of analyzing the economic costs of the 
excessively lax regulation of the financial services industry in Ireland during the period 2003 
to 2008.  The view that the lax regulatory regime of 2003-2008 was a policy error is widely 
accepted; some analysts made this point contemporaneous with this policy period (e.g., Kelly 
(2007),  Honohan (2004)) and many others after the subsequent Irish banking crisis (e.g., 
Elderfield (2010), Honohan (2009), O’Sullivan and Kennedy (2010)).  It is also established 
that this lax financial regulatory regime in Ireland contributed fundamentally to the 
magnitude of the 2008-2010 economic crash in Ireland; see Honohan et al. (2010), Kelly 
(2009), Regling and Watson (2010). We take it as given that this lax regulatory policy was a 
mistake, and analyze the economic costs associated with this policy mistake. Our sliding-
doors alternative choice is that the strict and prudent financial regulatory regime adopted in 
Ireland in 2009 was adopted six years earlier. 
 choice. The cumulative economic welfare 
difference between relevant economic outcomes under this choice and under the actual choice 
over all post-decision periods is our measure of the ex-post net economic cost of the actual 
policy decision. We argue that this restrictive evaluation procedure can be illuminating within 
certain narrow circumstances. The procedure delineates both the costs and benefits of feasible 
policy alternatives. 
                                                            
1 The “sliding doors” phrase comes from the common plot device in which fictional characters’ experiences are 
shown in two alternative realities, bifurcating at a single, changed event; the popular movies Sliding Doors 
(1998) and It’s a Wonderful Life (1945) are two well-known examples using this plot device.   
There were other contemporaneous policy errors in Ireland, such as in fiscal policy (see, e.g., 
Regling and Watson (2010), Conefrey and Fitzgerald (2009)), and planning and regional 
development policy (see, e.g., Kitchin, et al. (2010)).  We attempt to analyze in isolation the 
effects of the lax financial regulatory regime, not conflating these with the effects of other 
policy errors.  
We find that the lax regulation of banks in Ireland was the pivotal domestic policy error 
leading to the banking industry collapse of 2008-2010 and the deep Irish recession of 2009-
2010.  A few simple, reasonable but prudent constraints on bank risk-taking could have 
prevented the Irish banking collapse. Although Ireland would still have suffered along with 
the rest of the developed world from the impact of the US-centred 2008-2009 Great 
Recession, Ireland would not have experienced a domestic banking industry collapse. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, on the other hand, somewhat surprisingly, the “costs” of the 
policy error in terms of lost Irish national income are not that large, and may in fact be 
negative.  
The moderated-boom and moderated-bust in national income which would have come with a 
more prudent regulatory policy has offsetting effects. On the one hand, the policy error 
contributed substantially to the 14.8% decline in real GDP between 2008 and 2010 (inclusive, 
2010 estimated).  On the other hand, the stimulative impact of the foreign capital inflow 
associated with this policy error played a big role in generating the 44.4% increase in real 
GDP between 2003 and 2007 (inclusive). Even after accounting for bank bailout costs and 
future deadweight costs of fiscal readjustment, the policy error leads to a net cumulative 
effect on national income that is difficult to sign and may even be positive.  
A clear and significant impact of the lax regime on GDP is in the volatility of its annual 
growth, which is 7.4% per annum in the actual history, falling to 6.8% under a prudent 
regulatory regime. The social welfare costs of this policy error, including the recent period of 
high unemployment, business distress, and labour force dislocation, are associated with the 
policy error’s impact on this second-moment feature of Irish national income growth rather 
than its impact on the first-moment medium-term cumulative growth rate.      
2 A Simulated History of the Irish Banking Sector under a Strict and Prudent Financial 
Regulatory Regime  
 
Our starting date of January 2003 does not correspond to the beginning of lax financial 
regulation in Ireland.  Rather, it represented the continuation of the extremely lax regulatory 
regime firmly in place at that time.2
                                                            
2 Problems from excessively lax financial regulation go back a number of years in Ireland.  For example, John 
Hurley began his term as Governor of the CBFSAI in 2002. One of Hurley’s first challenges was to deal with a 
major scandal left over from his predecessor:  soon after he arrived in office a massive $691 million trading 
fraud was uncovered at AIB, tied to trading irregularities which had been missed by that bank and the financial 
regulator. This is one of many such scandals related to lax financial regulation in Ireland in the pre-2003 
period; see Ross (2009) for an extended discussion.   
  In the early years of this century, Ireland had one of the 
most under-regulated financial regulatory regimes in the developed world, and was described 
in the New York Times as “the Wild West Frontier of European finance” (Lavery and 
O’Brien (2005)).  After the credit crisis of 2008, and in particular the Lehmann Brothers 
bankruptcy and freezing on the interbank lending market, the Irish financial services sector 
collapsed dramatically. See Honohan et al. (2010) for a careful review of the Irish banking 
sector collapse and its causes and consequences; we do not duplicate the discussion here. Our 
sliding-doors alternative is that a strict and prudent financial regulatory regime was put in 
place in January 2003, and maintained throughout the 2003 – 2010 period.  
 
At each date t, we divide the aggregated domestic bank balance sheet assets into five 
categories: PD (for property development loans), RM (for domestic retail mortgages), BOD 
(for business loans and other domestic assets), MF (for central bank deposits and other assets 
placed with monetary financial institutions) and FA (for foreign assets other than property 
development loans).  We divide the banking sectors’ liabilities into five categories, DD (for 
domestic deposits), CFB (for covered foreign borrowing, which is that part of foreign 
borrowing covered by foreign assets), NFB (net foreign borrowing, equal to total foreign 
borrowing minus foreign assets), DIB (domestic institutional borrowing of the sector) and EQ 
(shareholders’ equity).   
 
Domestic institutional borrowing (DIB) is a small component of the balance sheet; since 
interbank borrowing between domestic banks is netted out, DIB consists of a relatively small 
amount of borrowing from Irish domestic non-bank financial institutions (such as insurance 
companies) which are not included in the domestic banking sector balance sheet. Net foreign 
borrowing, on the other hand, is very large, and entirely accounted for by interbank 
borrowing from foreign banks. In fact, interbank borrowing always exceeds net foreign 
borrowing, so that interbank borrowing is being used to fund foreign as well as domestic 
assets (see Chart 1).  Property development assets are mostly for domestic projects; only a 
small proportion is for overseas projects (see Chart 2). Note that this domestic-only bank 
balance sheet does not cover the foreign-regulated subsidiaries of Irish banks such as AIB-
UK Ltd.    
 
We use TA for total assets and note that by balance sheet definition: 
 
TA = PD+RM+BOD+MF+FA  = DD+DIB+CFB+NFB+EQ. 
 
We simulate an alternative balance sheet history for the sector assuming CBFSAI strict and 
prudential led to the following features for Irish domestic bank balance sheets: 
 
1. Domestic bank lending to the property development industry never exceeded 20% of the 
sectors aggregate bank’s domestic deposit base. 
2. The domestic banking sector’s net foreign borrowing (foreign borrowing minus foreign 
assets) never exceeded 10% of its domestic deposit base. 
 
Neither of these conditions is particularly strict.  We view them as observable sector-wide 
features of a reasonably prudent bank regulation regime, we do not view them as directly-
imposed criteria mandated on individual banks.  We do not attempt to model in detail how 
these sensible risk features of the domestic banking sector arise from reasonable and prudent 
regulation of all individual banks within the sector.  See Honohan et al. (2010) for a 
discussion of how wildly-irresponsible violations of risk criteria by rogue banks within the 
sector (effectively ignored by the regulator) led to very inappropriate, competitive responses 
by other institutions (also ignored by the regulator) and an extremely fragile, mostly 
insolvent, banking sector at the onset of the global credit crisis. 
 
In our simulation we impose the conditions in two steps, with condition 1 being imposed 
first.  In step 1, if PD/DD > 20% then we shrink PD and NFB equally until PD/TA = 20%.  It 
seems appropriate that the assumed regulatory pressure on the proportion in property 
development lending comes out of net foreign borrowing (and in particular, interbank 
borrowing) on the liability side, since this is the “residual” liability, whereas other liabilities 
are less subject to short-term bank control.  Second, if after PD has been adjusted in step 1, 
NFB/DD is still greater than 10% then we shrink NFB until NFB/DD = 10%.  In this case on 
the asset side we shrink all four domestic asset categories by an equal percentage, so that 
their relative percentages remained unchanged. We leave foreign assets unaffected. We 
define adjustable assets, AA, as the sum of PD, RM, BOD and MF. 
 
We use * to denote simulation values of all variables; variables without * denote actual 
values including variables which are unchanged by the simulation (such as DD).  We weaken 
the dynamic imposition of the two conditions by never requiring bank asset decreases, but 
only disallowing bank asset increases. The notion is that in practice, rather than being forced 
to liquidate assets in a given quarter to meet regulatory risk controls, the banking sector is 
allowed to “grow out” of any regulatory violations as domestic deposits grow.  So, in step 1 if 
(PDt,DDt) < .20 in a given quarter, then the next quarter we set PD*t+1 = PD*t or .20xDDt+1 
whichever is larger.  In step 2, if (NFBt/DDt) > .10 in a given quarter, then for the next 
quarter we set AA*t+1 = AA*t or the value of AA*t+1 which sets (NFB*t+1/DDt+1) = .10, 
whichever is larger.        
 
Charts 3-6 show actual and simulated assets and liabilities.  Charts 7 and 8 compare the risk 
features of the actual and simulated balance sheets.  Table 1 examines some stability and risk 
features of the actual and simulated bank sector in the first quarter of the data set, 2003:Q1 
and five years later in 2008:Q1 when the US-based credit-liquidity crisis was beginning to 
rattle global markets. The banking sector in the simulated history is not conservatively run 
(retail mortgages have grown by 19% per annum over this five-year period; and total assets 
also by 19% per annum) but it is not in vulnerable to a credit crisis.  Oddly enough, if we 
accept the ceteris paribus experiment, Ireland would still have been a big net importer of bank 
credit in the simulated history, and so, unlike Germany, France and the UK, not at risk from 
toxic-asset losses on US-based mortgage-related assets. (These toxic assets never directly 
infected Irish bank balance sheets; see Connor, Flavin and O’Kelly (2010)).  The ingredients 
for the Irish credit crisis were home-grown, based on a transformation of massive foreign 
interbank borrowing into massive domestic property development lending. A few simple, 
reasonable and prudent constraints by the CBFSAI on bank risk-taking would have almost 
entirely protected Ireland from this crisis.   
 
3. The Impact of a Prudential Financial Regulatory Regime on the Growth Path of 
National Income  
 
This section simulates the impact of the alternative, prudential regulatory regime on gross 
domestic product from 2003 to 2010.  To do this, we use macroeconomic models to infer the 
impact of the foreign credit flow and the increased stock of private sector debt on national 
income. 
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) we assume that the global macroeconomy 
undergoes a regime shift in January 2008, and we use different model specifications before 
and after this date.  Prior to this date, the net annual flow of net foreign borrowing is 
stimulative, whereas on and after this date, the stock of private sector debt (which includes 
the stock of net foreign borrowing) has a contractionary impact. We call the period 2003:q1 
to 2007:Q4 the boom period and 2008:Q1 to 2010:Q4 the bust period.   
During the boom period, we treat the increase in domestic-bank foreign borrowing supporting 
domestic expenditures as a stimulative expansion, with essentially the same effect as a debt-
financed increase in government expenditures in a Keynesian model.  As in a Keynesian 
model, we assume that in the short-run the macroeconomic reaction is non-Ricardian: 
economic agents respond to the stimulus associated with the increased cash expenditures 
associated with the foreign liability increase, but do not adjust their consumption/investment 
plans to account for the implied change in net national indebtedness. As in the previous 
section we use * to denote simulated values.  Let NFBt denote the stock of net foreign 
borrowing at the end of year t so that the associated stimulative foreign-financed expenditure, 
FFE, is the annual increase:  
 
FFEt = NFBt – NFBt-1.      (1)   
 
We assume that during the boom period simulated GDP is the same as actual GDP except for 
the differential effect of lower net foreign borrowing.  We let m denote the fiscal multiplier, 
giving the multiplicative impact of net-foreign-borrowing-financed expenditures on GDP.  
Describing GDP in the actual and simulated histories: 
GDPt = At + mFFEt       (2) 
GDP*t = At + mFFE*t       (3) 
where At denotes all GDP variation not related to net-foreign-borrowing-financed 
expenditures.  Taking the difference between equations (3) and (2), At cancels out giving 
GDP*t in terms of actual GDPt and the observable difference between the net-foreign-
borrowing-financed expenditures in the two histories: 
GDP*t = GDPt - m(FFEt – FFE*t)     (4) 
The value of the expenditure multiplier m in (4) is crucial to our analysis.  There is 
considerable uncertainty in the literature about its value, and how its value varies with 
circumstances.3
After 2007, the economic regime changes. After this date, a Ricardian-type correction occurs. 
Economic agents become aware of the dangerous overhang of private indebtedness and adjust 
their behaviour, leading to an economic contraction.  In the 2008-2010 bust regime, we rely 
on the estimates of Lang and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) who find that in developed markets the 
increase in the stock of private credit to GDP ratio between 2004 and 2007 is linked to the 
decrease in real GDP growth in each of the two crisis years 2008 and 2009. We measure 
private sector credit (PSC) as the sum of property development, residential mortgages, and 
business and other domestic assets:   
 Barro and Redling (2009) use annual data on military expenditures by the US 
government to estimate the annual fiscal multiplier, getting an estimate of 0.6 to 0.7.  We use 
the lower end of the Barro-Redling range as our base-case estimate, but also consider other 
values and re-run the analysis accordingly. The expenditure stimulus associated with the net 
foreign borrowing is very large.  Chart 9 shows the annual increase in net foreign borrowing 
each year, and Chart 10 converts this into percentage GDP stimulus using the baseline value 
of m = 0.6.   
 PSCt = PDt + RMt + BODt 
and the same for PSC*t using the simulated balance sheet values.  The private sector credit 
ratio (PSCR) is just PSC divided by GNP, PSCRt = PSCt/GNPt, and the same for the 
simulated value, using PSC*t and GDP*t. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti use panel data regression across a range of countries to estimate the 
impact of PSCR and other country-specific variables on the magnitude of the negative growth 
shock in each country in the crisis years 2008 and 2009 (inclusive).  Their linear model of 
real GDP growth takes the form: 
 gt = Bt + h(PSCR2007:Q4 – PSCR2003:Q4)   (5) 
with h = 0.0733 from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010, Table 6, column 4).  Note that (5) 
applies to real rather than nominal GDP growth rates.  Letting it denote observable inflation 
in period t gives gt = (GDPt/GDPt)/(1+it) -1 and g*t = (GDP*t/GDP*t)/(1+it) -1 where we 
assume inflation (and the variation in Bt) is unaffected by the simulation. We use the Eurostat 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for Ireland as the source of the annual inflation rate. 
Applying (5) to both the actual and simulated economies and rearranging gives: 
                                                            
3 See Aerbach and Garadnichenko (2010) and references therein. 
 GDP*t = (1+it){1 + gt + h[(PSCR2007:Q4 – PSCR2004:Q4)- (PSCR*2007:Q4 – 
PSCR*2004:Q4)]}GDP*t-1      (6) 
The PCSR calculated from the actual bank balance sheets and annual GDP is 1.36 in 2004:Q4 
and 2.06 in 2007:Q4; for the simulated balance sheets and GDP* it is 1.25 and 1.64, 
respectively.   
We make one adjustment to the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti estimates, allowing the linear effect of 
the private sector credit ratio on GDP growth to extend to the year 2010 in the Irish case, the 
Lane-Milesi-Ferretti estimation sample ends in 2009.  It seems clear that the enormous 
overhang of excessive private sector credit continued to impact Irish growth in 2010, 
although this might not be true for other developed markets which recovered more quickly.   
Table 2 shows actual and simulated nominal and real GDP, and these are also illustrated in 
Chart 11, along with the Honohan et al. (2010) simulations of real GDP without the Irish-
specific 2008-2010 bust (the Honohan simulation assumes that Irish real GDP growth would 
have matched the Eurozone average during this period).  Note that the Honohan simulation 
makes no adjustment during the earlier boom period, and instead uses the actual GDP values 
there. Honohan’s “Ireland without bust” simulation has “no-bust” Irish GDP 12% higher than 
actual GDP in 2010.  However this only adjusts for one side of the boom-bust cycle.  In our 
simulation, with both the credit-induced boom and credit-induced bust included, real GDP in 
2010 is only 0.84% higher under the prudent regime. Furthermore, this small difference does 
not take account of the much higher levels of real GDP in the years 2003-2007 in the boom 
period under lax financial regulation. 
Using a risk-neutral present discounted value metric with a risk-free nominal rate of 2%, and 
comparing the conditional realized GDP paths for the simulated and actual histories gives a 
cumulative GDP measure of the cost of the lax regulatory policy (assuming risk neutrality 
toward income volatility).  For the actual GDP history we also add in the (approximately) €50 
billion cost of the bank bailout, which is not yet paid as of 2010, but which will come out of 
future income, and a €7.5 billion deadweight cost, reflecting the future income costs of fiscal 
and economic re-adjustment that must take place due to the boom-bust cycle.  Please note 
that we do not attempt to correct for the very high social costs associated with the boom-bust 
cycle only the effects on cumulative GDP. Table 3 shows the results for a range of values of 
the fiscal multiplier m.  All the costs are stated in nominal 2010 euros, for convenience.4
                                                            
4 Using 2% to compound/discount cash flows across years. 
 In 
the base case, with m=0.6, the net economic cost in terms of lost GDP is minus €4.3 billion. 
A slightly lower value for the multiplier, m = 0.569, solves the numerical problem of giving 
total GDP cost of exactly zero.  In this case, the GDP gains from lax regulation in the boom 
are equal to the losses during the bust, plus the bank bailout and deadweight costs.  For the 
GDP gains and losses to be equal on their own, without taking account of bank bailout and 
deadweight costs, the expenditure multiplier must equal 0.16; see Table 3. If the reader feels 
that the deadweight costs of €7.5 billion are an underestimate, it is simple to adjust the costs 
by adding any additional amount, in 2010 nominal euros, to the total costs shown in the last 
column. We show an alternative case with high deadweight costs of €30 billion in the table.   
The enormous social costs associated with the boom-bust cycle are better captured by 
differences in the volatility of GDP growth rather than by differences in its cumulative level. 
Over the 2003-2010 period (inclusive) the Irish real GDP growth rate had a per-annum 
volatility of 7.39% whereas under the base-case prudent regime this falls to 6.80%. 
 
4.  Summary 
This paper describes a restrictive approach to the analysis of policy errors, an approach which 
we call sliding doors economic cost measurement. The analysis relies on identifying a past 
policy error, and counterfactually replacing it with a feasible alternative policy which was 
available at the time of the flawed decision.  Then, the ramifications of the alternative policy 
decision, what we call the “sliding doors alternative,” are examined and analyzed, by 
simulating the impact of this alternative decision on economic outcomes, and comparing to 
the actual outcomes which arose from the flawed decision.      
This restrictive procedure is difficult to implement and empirically challenging, but can be 
illuminating in some circumstances.  We apply the procedure to the 2008-2010 Irish banking 
crisis, and get useful results. 
One, we demonstrate that the extremely lax regulation of the Irish financial sector was the 
pivotal domestic policy error leading to the Irish banking crisis.  If Irish financial regulators 
had acted reasonably prudently over the 2003-2007 period, then Irish domestic markets 
would have been shaken but not stirred by the US-centred credit-liquidity crisis of 2008-
2009.  
Two, the macroeconomic effects of the excessively lax Irish financial regulatory policy was 
to increase the volatility of national income growth, and to reallocate income growth to the 
earlier “boom” years of the period while removing it from the later “bust” years.  The boom-
bust growth pattern engendered by this disastrous policy error had enormous social cost in 
terms of gyrating unemployment, business distress, and labour force dislocation, but the 
medium-term impact on cumulative national income is not measurably different from zero, 
and may even be positive. 
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Chart 5: Actual Domestic Banking Sector Aggregate Balance Sheet, Liabilities 
 
 
Chart 6: Simulated Domestic Banking Sector Aggregate Balance Sheet, Liabilities 
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Chart 7: Actual and Simulated Paths of Restricted Ratios  
 
 
Chart 8: Actual and Simulated Paths of Risk Factors 
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Chart 9: Annual Increase in Net Foreign Borrowing (millions €) 
 
 
Chart 10: GDP Stimulus Associated with Annual Increase in Net Foreign Borrowing  
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Chart11: Aggregate Real GDP under Actual and Simulated Histories 
 
 
Table 1: Key Risk Features of the Irish Domestic Banking Sector in 2008:Q1 under the 
Actual and Prudent Regulatory Regimes 
Column1 Actual With Prudent 
Bank 
Regulation 
Property Development 
Assets €124.7bn €51.4bn 
% Total Assets 17.4 8.4 
% GDP 69.3 29.7 
Net Foreign Borrowing €132.6bn €26.9bn 
% Total Assets 18.5 4.4 
% GDP 73.6 15.5 
Residential Mortgages 
2003:Q1 €45.4bn €45.4bn 
Residential Mortgages 
2008:Q1 €124.4bn €109.6bn 
Residential Mortgages p.a. 
growth rate (%) 22.3 19.3 
Property Development p.a. 
growth rate (%) 42.4 19.3 
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Table 2: Nominal and Real GDP under Actual and Simulated Histories 
Year 
Nominal GDP 
(Actual) 
Nominal GDP 
(With Prudent 
Regulation) 
Real GDP 
(Actual) 
Real GDP (With 
Prudent 
Regulation) 
2003 €140008 €136343 €116698 €113643 
2004 €149344 €135424 €125098 €113438 
2005 €162314 €151267 €134572 €125413 
2006 €177343 €166545 €146773 €137836 
2007 €189374 €177788 €160443 €150627 
2008 €179989 €172990 €149265 €143460 
2009 €159646 €157342 €134818 €132872 
2010 €155491 €156797 €136650 €137798 
 
Table 3: Alternative Estimates of the Fiscal Multiplier and the Implied Net Cumulative 
National Income Impact 
Fiscal 
Multiplier 
Cumulative 
GDP Cost of 
Lax Regulation 
Bank Bailout 
Cost 
Deadweight 
Costs of 
Adjustment (lost 
future GDP) 
Implied 
Cumulative GDP 
Cost of Lax 
Regulation 
0.6 -€61,841 €50,000 €7,500 -€4,341 
0.57 -€57,500 €50,000 €7,500 €0 
0.4 -€33,676 €50,000 €7,500 €23,824 
0.3 -€19,566 €50,000 €7,500 €37,934 
0.16 €0 €50,000 €7,500 €57,500 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
0.6 -€61,841 €50,000 €30,000 €25,659 
0.57 -€57,500 €50,000 €30,000 €30,000 
0.4 -€33,676 €50,000 €30,000 €53,824 
0.3 -€19,566 €50,000 €30,000 €67,934 
0.16 €0 €50,000 €30,000 €87,500 
 
 
